The End of the Era of Armed Kurdish Forces?
The End of the Era of Armed Kurdish Forces?
From Peace with the PKK to the Dissolution of the SDF and the Withdrawal of Western Forces from Kurdistan: Is the Middle East Entering a New Phase?
Analysis – Radio Jiyar
Within a relatively short period, several major developments have been unfolding across the Middle East. Although they may initially appear unrelated, taken together they could signal a major shift in the political and security dynamics surrounding the Kurdish issue.
In Turkey, the peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has entered a legal and implementation phase, with the Turkish parliament approving legislation in August 2026 aimed at advancing the disarmament and dissolution process.
In Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have ended their independent military structure and begun the process of integrating their forces into the Syrian state’s institutions.
At the same time, Germany has ended its military mission in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, while the withdrawal of the U.S.-led coalition from Iraq has entered its final stage.
This raises a fundamental question:
Are these developments merely coincidental, or is the region moving toward the end of a particular model of Kurdish politics — one based on independent armed forces and Western military support?
The PKK: The End of Four Decades of Armed Struggle?
One of the most significant developments is the process that has emerged between the Turkish government and the PKK.
In February 2025, Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, called for an end to armed struggle and the dissolution of the organization. Several months later, the PKK announced its decision to dissolve and end its armed campaign.
However, the process entered a new phase in 2026.
On August 10, 2026, the Turkish parliament approved a new legal framework intended to advance the peace and disarmament process. The legislation links several subsequent stages to progress in the disarmament process.
This development should not be viewed simply as an agreement between Ankara and the PKK.
If the process reaches its final stage, one of the Middle East’s longest-running Kurdish armed movements will have left the military arena, while the Kurdish issue in Turkey will increasingly move into the fields of law, politics, parliament and negotiation.
But this does not mean that the Kurdish question in Turkey has been resolved.
Questions surrounding political rights, civil liberties, language rights, decentralization, prisoners and the political status of Kurds remain.
For this reason, the real success of the peace process will not be measured simply by the number of weapons surrendered, but by a much more important question:
After the end of armed struggle, will sufficient political space be created to guarantee Kurdish rights and allow meaningful political participation?
Syria: The SDF Is No Longer an Independent Army
Developments in Syria may be even more significant from this perspective.
For years, the Syrian Democratic Forces were the main military partner of the United States in the fight against ISIS. The SDF developed a powerful military and administrative structure across northeastern Syria.
But on August 25, 2026, Mazloum Abdi announced that the SDF would no longer exist as an independent military force and that its forces would enter the Syrian state’s military structure under an agreement with Damascus.
This does not necessarily mean the end of the political role of Kurds in Syria.
On the contrary, one of the important elements of the agreement is an effort to guarantee certain political and cultural rights for Syria’s Kurds. Several former SDF figures are also expected to assume roles within the new state structure.
Mazloum Abdi himself was appointed as an adviser to the Syrian president on August 28.
The emerging model therefore appears to be:
Independent Kurdish armed force → integration into the state military → preservation of part of the political role within the state
This distinction is crucial.
The objective is no longer the creation of an independent Kurdish army. Instead, the emerging approach appears to be transferring military power into state institutions while converting part of the former military influence into political power.
However, many questions remain about how the integration will actually work. The chain of command, the organization of former SDF units, the status of women who served in the SDF and the degree of autonomy retained by former SDF forces remain unresolved.
Iraqi Kurdistan: What Does the Western Withdrawal Mean?
Signs of change are also visible in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
On August 26, 2026, Germany ended its military and training mission in the Kurdistan Region after years of supporting the Peshmerga. The mission had been part of the international coalition’s efforts against ISIS.
At the same time, the broader withdrawal of the international anti-ISIS coalition from Iraq is approaching its final stage, with the withdrawal deadline set for the end of September 2026.
This does not, by itself, mean the end of Western support for the Kurdistan Region.
But it sends an important message:
The era of a large-scale Western military presence in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region is coming to an end.
This could alter the balance of power between Erbil, Baghdad, Ankara, Tehran and Washington.
Has the United States Abandoned Its Kurdish Allies?
This is one of the most sensitive questions.
Historical experience shows that the relationship between the United States and Kurdish forces has often been based on strategic interests and specific security threats, rather than a permanent commitment to establishing an independent Kurdish state.
When ISIS represented the primary threat, Washington needed the SDF and the Peshmerga.
Now that the international coalition’s main anti-ISIS mission is approaching its conclusion, the importance of a direct U.S. military presence is also declining.
Therefore, instead of saying that “the United States has abandoned the Kurds,” it may be more accurate to say:
The United States is changing the nature of its relationship with Kurdish forces.
This distinction is important.
Washington may continue to support the political rights and security of the Kurdistan Region, but it may no longer be willing to maintain the same level of military presence simply to preserve independent Kurdish armed forces.
Is Turkey the Biggest Winner?
If these developments are viewed together, the answer is, to a considerable extent, yes.
For years, Turkey has faced three interconnected security issues involving Kurdish forces:
The PKK inside Turkey, the SDF in Syria, and concerns surrounding the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
Now all three files are changing.
Inside Turkey, the PKK is moving toward dissolution and the end of armed struggle.
In Syria, the SDF is no longer an independent military force.
In Iraq, the Western military presence that has provided an important layer of security for the Kurdistan Region is being reduced.
Ankara has also openly welcomed the dissolution of the SDF as an independent force and its integration into the Syrian state, describing the process as consistent with the principle of “one state, one army.”
From Turkey’s security perspective, the current developments could therefore represent a major strategic success.
But a Turkish victory does not necessarily mean the issue is over.
If Kurds in Turkey, Syria and Iraq move away from armed struggle while becoming stronger political actors, Ankara may have to confront a Kurdish political question rather than primarily a security problem.
Such a challenge may be easier to manage from a military perspective, but far more complicated politically.
Will the Kurdistan Region Also Move Toward Peshmerga Integration?
This possibility should not be ignored.
The Peshmerga is fundamentally different from both the SDF and the PKK. It is the official military force of the Kurdistan Region, whose existence is recognized within Iraq’s constitutional framework.
Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the Peshmerga will follow exactly the same path as the SDF.
Yet one longstanding question remains:
Can the Peshmerga move away from partisan structures and become a unified, professional military force under the authority of the official institutions of the Kurdistan Region?
The Kurdistan Regional Government has stated that the process of unifying the Peshmerga forces should be completed by the end of 2026. At the same time, reports have emerged concerning a significant reduction in U.S. financial support for Peshmerga salaries.
If this process coincides with the withdrawal of foreign forces, the Kurdistan Region could face a historic choice:
Either transform the Peshmerga into a unified and institutional military force, or face increasing pressure from Baghdad for deeper integration of its security structures.
Are These Developments Part of a Larger Plan?
It is difficult to prove that all of these developments are the result of a single American, Turkish or Western plan.
However, when viewed in terms of their consequences, a common pattern can be identified.
The Old Model:
Kurdish armed force + territory under control + external support + negotiations with the central government
The Emerging Model:
Central government + one army + Kurdish political rights + participation in state institutions
This may be the most important aspect of the recent developments.
In Syria, this model is being tested through the integration of the SDF into the state.
In Turkey, it is taking shape through the end of the PKK’s armed struggle.
And in Iraq, the unification of the Peshmerga could become the next stage of this process.
Has the Dream of a Kurdish State Come to an End?
The simple answer is:
No — but the path toward it has changed dramatically.
During the twentieth century, many Kurdish movements believed that armed struggle and the support of foreign powers could pave the way toward independence or autonomy.
The experience of recent decades, however, has demonstrated that major powers, even when they provide military support to Kurdish forces, are not necessarily willing to bear the strategic costs of creating an independent Kurdish state.
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is an important example.
The 2017 independence referendum demonstrated that a significant part of Iraqi Kurdish society supported independence. Yet opposition from Baghdad and neighboring states, combined with the lack of support from major international powers, prevented the project from achieving its goal.
The central question today may therefore no longer be:
“How do we establish a Kurdish state?”
Instead, it may increasingly be:
“How can Kurds secure the greatest possible political, economic, cultural and security rights without having an independent state?”
From an “Armed Kurdistan” to a “Political Kurdistan”?
Perhaps this is the most important transformation of all.
If current trends continue, we may see a decline in the role of independent Kurdish armed forces and a growing role for political parties, parliaments, civil society organizations and local governments.
Under this model, Kurdish power will no longer be measured primarily by the number of fighters or weapons.
It will increasingly be measured by political influence, economic capacity, participation in government and negotiating power.
This transformation represents both an opportunity and a threat for the Kurds.
It is an opportunity because the end of armed conflict could save thousands of lives and create greater space for political activity and economic development.
But it is also a threat if central governments use the end of armed struggle as an opportunity to suppress Kurdish political and cultural demands.
For this reason, the end of weapons alone does not constitute peace.
Peace becomes sustainable only when politics and rights fill the space once occupied by weapons.
Three Scenarios for the Future
Scenario One: Successful Integration and Lasting Peace
The PKK completely abandons armed struggle, Turkey advances political reforms, the SDF secures a defined position within the Syrian state, and the Kurdistan Region succeeds in unifying the Peshmerga.
In this scenario, the Middle East enters a new phase in which the Kurdish question becomes increasingly political rather than military.
Scenario Two: The End of Weapons Without a Solution
Armed forces may be dissolved, but Kurdish political and cultural rights may not be adequately guaranteed.
In such a situation, weapons may disappear while grievances remain.
Over the long term, this could create conditions for the return of conflict.
Scenario Three: The Return of Great-Power Competition
If competition among the United States, Turkey, Iran, Russia and the central governments intensifies again, Kurdish forces could once more become instruments in regional power struggles.
History suggests that temporary alliances can change when strategic interests change.
Conclusion: The End of an Era or the Beginning of a New One?
What we are witnessing today is not necessarily the end of the Kurdish question. It may be the end of one particular model of the Kurdish question.
The PKK is moving toward the end of armed struggle.
The SDF is no longer an independent military force.
Western forces are reducing their military presence in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region.
The Peshmerga is under increasing pressure to unify.
And Turkey is more openly than ever promoting the principle of “one state, one army.”
All of these developments raise a historic question:
Will the twenty-first century witness the end of an “Armed Kurdistan” and the emergence of a “Political Kurdistan”?
If the answer is yes, this does not necessarily represent a historic defeat for the Kurds.
It could instead be a historic transition:
from guns to politics,
from the mountains to parliament,
from armed forces to political institutions,
and from dependence on foreign powers toward greater reliance on society and democratic structures.
But the danger is equally clear:
If governments in the region take away Kurdish weapons without granting Kurdish rights, lasting peace will remain impossible.
The real test of the coming years, therefore, will not simply be the dissolution of the PKK, the end of the SDF as an independent military force, or the withdrawal of Western forces.
The real test is whether, after the end of the era of Kurdish armed forces, an era of political rights and equality for the Kurds will begin.
And perhaps this will ultimately determine whether the dream of a Kurdish state has truly become history — or whether it has simply changed its form and its path.
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