From the Birth of the SDF to Its Dissolution: Have Syria’s Kurds Become Victims of Regional Power Politics?

From Kobani to Damascus: More than a decade of war, thousands killed, and a dream of self-rule now facing a new political reality

The announcement by Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), on August 25, 2026, that the SDF’s independent military mission has come to an end is more than the dissolution of a military organization. It marks the end of an important chapter in the modern history of Syria’s Kurds.

For more than a decade, the SDF evolved from a military coalition fighting ISIS into one of Syria’s most important political and military actors. It controlled large parts of northeastern Syria, fought ISIS with direct U.S. support, and established a form of self-administration in the areas under its control.

Now, after years of war, thousands of deaths, and reliance on foreign powers, the SDF is being integrated into the Syrian state’s military structure and is losing its status as an independent armed force.

The central question is:

Did Syria’s Kurds achieve the goals for which they fought, or were they once again used as pawns in the power struggles of regional and international actors?

When and Why Was the SDF Founded?

To understand the history of the SDF, it is necessary to go back several years before its establishment.

After the Syrian uprising and the outbreak of civil war in 2011, Kurdish forces gradually took control of parts of northern Syria. The People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) became the main military forces of the Kurdish movement.

A major turning point came in 2014, when ISIS attacked Kurdish areas, particularly Kobani.

The battle for Kobani attracted international attention to Syria’s Kurdish forces and laid the foundation for military cooperation between the YPG and the U.S.-led international coalition.

In October 2015, a multi-ethnic military alliance known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) was established.

The alliance included Kurdish, Arab, Assyrian/Syriac and other local forces. In practice, however, the YPG and YPJ remained its military backbone.

The SDF’s stated objective was to defeat ISIS and establish a democratic, secular and decentralized Syria.

The project was therefore not formally limited to creating an independent Kurdish state. Instead, the Kurdish-led administration sought a form of self-government and decentralization within Syria.

How Did the SDF Become a Major Military Power?

With military support from the United States and the international coalition, the SDF became the main ground force fighting ISIS in Syria.

American, British and French forces provided training, advice and military assistance, while coalition air power played a major role in supporting SDF operations.

The SDF first defended Kobani and then launched a series of major operations to push ISIS out of northern and eastern Syria.

Cities including Manbij, Tabqa and Raqqa were captured from ISIS.

Finally, in March 2019, the last territorial stronghold of ISIS at Baghuz fell.

The SDF said that more than 11,000 of its fighters were killed and more than 21,000 were wounded during the campaign against ISIS.

Other U.S. government assessments have also referred to more than 10,000 SDF fighters killed during the anti-ISIS campaign.

The exact figures vary between sources, but one fact is beyond dispute:

The SDF paid an enormous human cost in the war against ISIS.

Did the SDF Achieve Its Goals?

The answer cannot simply be “yes” or “no.”

If the SDF’s primary objective is understood as defeating ISIS and creating a secure environment for millions of people, then the SDF was largely successful.

It drove ISIS from large parts of northeastern Syria and established an extensive administrative and security structure.

The SDF also became responsible for guarding thousands of ISIS prisoners and their families in detention camps.

The United States continued to view the SDF as its principal local partner in the fight against ISIS.

But if the objective is defined as establishing permanent political and military self-rule for Syria’s Kurds, the picture is very different.

The SDF never succeeded in transforming its military power into a permanently recognized political arrangement accepted by Damascus, Ankara and the major international powers.

This was perhaps its greatest weakness:

The SDF had military power, but it lacked a permanent political and international guarantee capable of turning that power into a lasting political settlement.

Turkey: The Biggest Threat to Syria’s Kurdish Project

From the beginning, Turkey opposed the growing power of the YPG and SDF along its southern border.

Ankara viewed the YPG as closely linked to the PKK and considered the emergence of a powerful Kurdish armed structure along its border a national security threat.

Turkey launched major military operations in northern Syria in 2016, 2018 and 2019. These operations resulted in the SDF losing control of several areas.

This created a major contradiction for Syria’s Kurds:

The United States supported the SDF in its fight against ISIS, while Washington’s NATO ally, Turkey, was simultaneously fighting the same Kurdish forces.

This demonstrated that U.S. support for the SDF was largely tied to the strategic objective of defeating ISIS and did not necessarily amount to a long-term American commitment to an independent Kurdish state or permanent Kurdish autonomy.

The Main Weakness: Dependence on Foreign Support

One of the most important lessons from the history of the SDF is its dependence on foreign powers.

Without U.S. military and political support, the SDF would not have become the military power it eventually became.

But that dependence was also its greatest vulnerability.

In 2019, former U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw some American forces from northern Syria opened the way for a Turkish military operation against Kurdish-held areas.

Many Kurds viewed the move as a form of abandonment by an ally they had fought alongside during the most difficult years of the war.

But this was not simply about the United States.

Russia, Turkey, Iran, Damascus and Arab regional actors all sought, at different times, to use the Kurdish issue to advance their own interests.

As a result, Syria’s Kurds faced not only ISIS, but also the geopolitical pressures created by Turkey, the United States, Russia and the Syrian central government.

Were Syria’s Kurds Victims of a Political Game?

To a large extent, yes — but the reality is more complicated.

The SDF successfully exploited the fractures created by the Syrian war and transformed Syria’s Kurds into a significant military and political actor.

For the first time in modern Syrian history, Kurdish political forces controlled a large territory and became central to the international debate over Syria’s future.

But this power was heavily dependent on the circumstances of the war.

The United States needed the SDF to defeat ISIS.

Russia repeatedly attempted to exploit tensions between Damascus, Ankara and the Kurds to strengthen its influence.

Turkey sought to prevent the emergence of a powerful Kurdish structure along its border.

Damascus, both under Bashar al-Assad and during the post-Assad transition, continued to emphasize Syria’s territorial integrity and the restoration of central authority.

As a result, Syria’s Kurds often found themselves becoming allies of one power in order to confront another, without ever securing a permanent political agreement guaranteeing their rights.

The Fall of Bashar al-Assad: A New Phase

The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 fundamentally changed Syria’s political landscape.

The SDF, which had operated for years as an autonomous military and political actor, now faced a new government in Damascus.

Negotiations between the SDF and the new Syrian authorities began, eventually producing agreements aimed at integrating SDF forces into state institutions.

The process entered a decisive phase in 2026.

According to estimates cited by the European Union Agency for Asylum, the SDF's military strength was estimated at around 100,000 personnel in early and mid-2025. By late January 2026, estimates had fallen to approximately 50,000–80,000, while significant areas previously controlled by the SDF had also changed hands during the military developments of 2026.

On August 25, 2026, Mazloum Abdi announced that the SDF’s independent military mission had ended and that the force would no longer operate as an independent military organization.

According to reports, SDF forces are being integrated into the Syrian military structure, while some former SDF commanders have been given positions within the new Syrian military establishment.

Is This the Defeat of the SDF?

From a military perspective, the SDF has lost its independent military status.

Politically, however, the story is not necessarily over.

The most important achievement for Syria’s Kurds may no longer be maintaining an independent army, but transforming the gains of the past decade into guaranteed political, cultural and linguistic rights.

The Syrian authorities have made commitments regarding Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights, while Mazloum Abdi has also emphasized the importance of Kurdish-language education and cultural rights.

But there is a significant difference between a political promise and a constitutional and legally enforceable guarantee.

That gap may become the most important challenge facing Syria’s Kurds.

What Does the Future Hold for Syria’s Kurds?

Three broad scenarios appear possible.

Scenario One: Limited Self-Government Within Syria

This may be the most realistic scenario.

The Kurds would lose their independent military force but retain some form of local administration, cultural rights, Kurdish-language education and political participation within a decentralized Syrian state.

In this scenario, the former Rojava model would not survive in its previous military form, but some of its civil and political structures could remain within a more decentralized Syria.

Scenario Two: A Return to Full Centralization

If Damascus eventually seeks to restore strong centralized rule and restrict local autonomous structures, Syria’s Kurds could lose many of the political gains they achieved during the war.

Questions surrounding Kurdish-language education, local governance, security and political representation could once again become sources of conflict.

This would be the most dangerous scenario for the Kurdish population.

Scenario Three: A Genuine Political Settlement

The best outcome for both Syria’s Kurds and Syria as a whole would be a lasting political agreement guaranteeing:

• Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights;

• legal and sustainable Kurdish-language education;

• meaningful local administrative powers;

• effective Kurdish participation in national political institutions;

• integration of local security forces into the national structure without leaving Kurdish-majority areas defenseless;

• and a clear rejection of policies aimed at denying Kurdish identity.

Under such circumstances, it could be argued that the sacrifices made by thousands of SDF fighters ultimately produced a lasting political achievement.

A Historical Contradiction

The story of the SDF contains a profound contradiction.

Syria’s Kurds fought to defeat ISIS, but once ISIS was territorially defeated, the strategic importance of the SDF to its main military backer declined.

During the war, the SDF was indispensable to Washington.

But after the defeat of ISIS and the transformation of Syria’s political landscape, its strategic value to the United States changed.

Turkey, meanwhile, continued to oppose the military power of the YPG.

Eventually, Damascus was able to use the new political environment to restore part of the central government’s authority.

The experience of the SDF therefore carries an important lesson for Kurdish movements across the Middle East:

Military power can turn a marginalized community into a political actor, but without a durable political settlement and meaningful guarantees, military power alone cannot permanently secure political gains.

Did the SDF Fail or Make History?

Perhaps neither answer is sufficient on its own.

The SDF failed to permanently establish an independent military structure and a fully consolidated form of self-government.

But it also played a historic role in defeating ISIS across large parts of Syria, created a multi-ethnic administrative system, and moved the question of Syria’s Kurds from the political margins to the center of discussions about Syria’s future.

The SDF also paid an enormous human price. More than 11,000 of its fighters were reported killed in the campaign against ISIS by 2019, with more than 21,000 wounded.

So perhaps the most important question today is not:

“Did the SDF win or lose?”

The real question is:

Will Damascus, Washington, Ankara and other regional powers recognize the political and cultural gains achieved by Syria’s Kurds, or will the end of the SDF’s military mission open another chapter of pressure on the Kurdish population?

The answer could shape not only the future of Syria’s Kurds, but the political structure of Syria itself.

Conclusion

The dissolution of the SDF marks the end of one era, but it does not necessarily mark the end of the Kurdish question in Syria.

Syria’s Kurds may no longer have an independent army, but after more than a decade of conflict they have gained political experience, civil institutions, a history of self-administration and a significant place in Syria’s political landscape.

The greatest test for Damascus now is whether it can transform this moment into a genuine national agreement between Kurds and the other communities of Syria.

If Kurdish rights are firmly protected through Syria’s constitution and political institutions, the dissolution of the SDF could represent the end of a military chapter and the beginning of a new political one.

But if those rights remain only temporary promises designed to end a military crisis, the Kurdish question could once again become one of Syria’s most important sources of instability.

For Syria’s Kurds, the war may be entering its final chapter — but the struggle over political rights, identity and their place in Syria’s future has only entered a new phase.